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WEST GERMAN REARMAMENT
By C. G. D. ONSLOW
PROBABLY the most consistent feature of the policy ofthe three Western powers—the United States, Great Bri-
tain, and France—towards the defeated Germany, from the
time of Potsdam until a few months ago, was the emphasis on
the need for the disarmament and demilitarization of the
Germany of the future; and when it was decided, in 1949, to
establish the Federal Republic of Western Germany, this pol-
icy was endorsed once more.
In June 1949, the Foreign Ministers of the three powers met
in Paris, and on the twentieth of that month the High Com-
mission charter was signed. At a second meeting held early
in November of the same year, also in Paris, it was agreed that
certain wider powers should be granted to the Federal Repub-
lic through the High Commissioners. Nevertheless when, on
November 22, the definitive Occupation Statute, sometimes
known as the Petersberg agreement, came to be signed by
Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the new Republic, and by the
three High Commissioners at the Petersberg Hotel in Bonn,
the headquarters of the High Commission, it contained the
following significant clause:
III . The Federal Government further declares its earnest determi-
nation to maintain the demilitarization of the Federal territory and to
endeavor by all means in its power to prevent the re-creation of armed
forces of any kind. To this end the Federal Government will co-operate
fully with the High Commission in the work of the Military Security
Board.
This would seem categorical enough; but at the same time it
must be mentioned that the subject of German rearmament
had begun to be actively debated in the press on both sides of
the Atlantic. Although the only immediate outcome of these
discussions was to be a reiteration of former policy on the part
of the Western powers, they are nevertheless interesting, as
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WEST GERMAN REARMAMENT 451
providing the first signs of a change in public opinion with
regard to the arming of Germany.
The curiosity of the press seems originally to have been
aroused by the second Paris meeting of the Foreign Ministers.
It was stimulated by reports, mentioned in the New York
Times of November IS that "staff officers of a number of West
European countries have been discussing the difference that
the raising of even five German divisions would make to the
defense of Europe, on the thesis, apparently, that without
German divisions there just are not enough troops in the West
to hold the Russians," and by reference to the changed situa-
tion that might arise were the Russians to withdraw their forces
of occupation from East Germany. Secretary of State Dean
Acheson, since his return from Paris, had frequently been asked
at press conferences whether the question of German rearma-
ment had been discussed at the Foreign Ministers' meeting, and
as frequently he had denied that it had. On November 16, he
repeated this denial and the following day President Truman
confirmed it; but for some reason these statements do not ap-
pear to have been considered as specific or categorical. The
London Times reported that "words like 'gendarmerie' and
'internal security' and phrases like 'forces adequate to hold
the Rhine' were beginning to be heard" in the United States,
although the "evasions" of the President and Mr. Acheson
were regarded in Britain less as foreshadowing an early change
in American policy than as reserving America's freedom of
decision for the day when circumstances might have altered.
Meanwhile, various public figures contributed their private
opinions on the question. In a speech at Boston, General
Lucius D. Clay, former commander of the United States
forces in Germany, suggested that a composite military force,
to include German infantry, might be formed for the defense
of Western Europe. In Paris, Senator Thomas of Oklahoma,
in an interview with the correspondent of he Monde, expressed
his view that a German force was necessary for the defense of
the West, and said that "several divisions of German troops
should be armed by the United States without Germany her-
self being permitted to manufacture arms."
British and French opinion, however, remained hostile to
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452 WORLD POLITICS
the idea. M. Teitgen, the French Minister of Information,
stated that "it must be realized that France could not remain
part of a security system that encompassed German rearma-
ment." The French Assembly's defense debate at the end of
November confirmed the view that Germany must remain ex-
cluded from the Atlantic Pact and that the reconstitution of
an armed force on her territory must be forbidden. In the
course of this debate, Foreign Minister Robert Schuman said
that "to rearm Germany would be to invite conflicts for which
the French government wished to assume neither risks nor re-
sponsibility." Many Frenchmen, indeed, seemed to be as uneasy
at the prospect of an inadequately defended no-man's-land
on their eastern flank as they were at the idea of a resuscitated
German army. One deputy, M. Pierre Cot, went so far as to
maintain that there were only two hypotheses—either the
Germans must be enabled to defend themselves or they must
be defended by the French; but in answer, M. Schuman made
the assertion, significant in the light of later developments,
that the present danger vis-a-vis Germany lay in the economic
sphere and that the only solution to that danger was to be found
in an economic organization on the European scale.
On the American side, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson,
arriving in Europe for the Paris meeting of the Atlantic Pact
Defense Ministers, stated at Frankfurt: "President Truman
has said that the United States has no intention to rearm Ger-
many: that is official United States policy, with no hedging
and no dodging." But the New York Times now pointed out
that the following important question remained unanswered:
"How," it asked, "does the United States expect to defend
Western Europe, which now includes Berlin, against a min-
imum of 175 Russian divisions without drawing upon Ger-
man manpower?"
At this point the German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer,
allowed himself to be drawn into the discussion. Hitherto,
virtually his only contribution had been a statement made on
November 22 that "I do not want a German army." But
on December 3, in an interview with a correspondent of the
Cleveland Plain Dealer, he went on record with a pronounce-
ment to the effect that "Germany should contribute to the de-
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WEST GERMAN REARMAMENT 453
fense of Europe in a European army under the command of a
higher European headquarters."
This interview appears to have caused something of a sen-
sation, and in the course of the next few days Dr. Adenauer was
repeatedly called upon to explain precisely what he meant.
This he attempted to do, at press conferences and at meetings of
his party, particularly at the C.D.U. congress at Koenigswinter
on December 9. The gist of these various statements may be
summarized as follows. Dr. Adenauer emphasized that he
remained fundamentally opposed to the rearmament of the
German Republic: "I have always taken the view," he said,
"that the security of West Germany was a matter for the
occupying powers"; but the Allies must realize that Germany
is not a desert but a thickly populated country and that it
would be a fatal mistake to leave Germany defenseless against
possible aggression from the East. In regard to the "people's
army" being formed in East Germany, it was necessary to say
to the Allies: "You cannot leave us without protection."
The Allies must ask themselves which was the greater
danger—the threat from Russia or the possibility of a German
contingent in a European army for the defense of Europe.
If, he added, our people are forced to take a hand at some
unforeseen time in the defense of Europe, then we could only
do so on the basis of equal rights and within the framework of
a European army: "I should be in favor, not of an independent
Wehrmacht, but of a German contingent in such a European
force; I should be opposed to Germans being accepted into,
or recruited for, a non-German contingent, or to their serving
as mercenaries."
The reception accorded to these explanations, both within
Germany and without, was distinctly cold. The following
week all parties of the Bundestag were unanimous in repudiat-
ing any idea of rearmament, while in allied circles Dr.
Adenauer's temerity in continuing to discuss the subject after
he had apparently been advised to steer clear of it seems to
have earned him a rebuke from the High Commission. In other
quarters the Chancellor was censured for resorting to "news-
paper diplomacy," and it was felt that he had been profiting
from the occasion to send up a few trial balloons. It was con-
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454 WORLD POLITICS
sidered regrettable that these statements, coming as they did
so soon after the conclusion of the Petersberg agreement, might
lead the latter to be regarded as merely another scrap of paper.
But while there was a general feeling that Dr. Adenauer had
been guilty of talking out of turn, a leading article in the
London Times of December 19, though stressing the dangers
of German rearmament, repeats that the question must never-
theless be considered against the background of Russian policy,
for "while the best defense lies in political and economic re-
construction of Germany, the Russians, by forming the armed
police force in East Germany, have been the first to begin the
rearmament programme, and this alone will make some de-
gree of rearmament in West Germany necessary before the
Western Powers can leave." But although this article, and
others appearing about the same time in papers such as the
New York Herald Tribune, the London Economist, and he
Monde, all emphasized that the prospect was one that must be
faced, there seemed to be a widespread reluctance in the ranks
of the statesmen concerned to face it immediately, in public
at least.
During the early months of 1950, in fact, the question of
German rearmament seems to have fallen out of favor as a
topic of popular discussion. Of the statements, however, one
in particular, made by the United States High Commissioner,
John J. McCloy, at Stuttgart shortly after his return from dis-
cussions in Washington with President Truman and Mr. Ache-
son, is worthy of note. Speaking in the hall where, three and
a half years before, James Byrnes had pronounced the funda-
mentals of American policy towards Germany, Mr. McCloy
used "firm words." He advised the Germans to do some "very
straight thinking" and told them that there was nothing to be
attained by political maneuvers. "Germany," he continued,
"cannot be allowed to develop political conditions or a mili-
tary status which would threaten other nations or the peace
of the world. That means there will be no German army or
air force. German security will best be protected by German
participation in a closely knit Western European community."
And, some six weeks later, in the course of a speech delivered
in Berlin, Mr. McCloy further stated: "The task is to build
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WEST GERMAN REARMAMENT 455
up a military organization at Fontainebleau, not in Germany."
Not everyone, however, was satisfied. During March, both
Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden raised the question in
the House of Commons; but when Mr. Churchill, during a
debate on defense, expressed his belief that Europe could not
be defended without the aid of Germany, he only succeeded
in drawing from Prime Minister Clement Attlee the comment
that it was a most difficult and thorny subject and that his
(Mr. Churchill's) references to it were extremely irresponsible
and injudicious. Again, towards the end of March, Foreign
Secretary Ernest Bevin, referring to the question of German
rearmament, said, "We are all against it" and expressed his
fear of "setting the clock back," emphasizing that it was of the
greatest importance that Germany and France should some-
how be brought together. Commenting on these statements, the
London Times stressed the need to bring Germany into full
contact with the rest of Western Europe, but not in such a
way as to throw the whole off balance. The longer the forma-
tion of a German army could wait, the better; rearmament of
Germany at once could only be risked if it meant an immediate
increase of strength to the West, and only under cover of a
stronger force than Europe now possessed.
For the rest, those newspaper correspondents who are still
curious enough to ask questions on the "difficult and thorny"
subject were rewarded by no new answers. At a press confer-
ence on April 6, Mr. Acheson declared that "The United
States has firm international commitments, both for German
disarmament and against German rearmament, and there is no
change in this position." On April 22, Mr. McCloy reiterated
that "we do not favor and do not contemplate the creation
of a West German army."
At this point, however, a new outlet for discussion presented
itself, and the promulgation by the Military Security Board
of what was described as the "definitive law for the prevention
of German rearmament" passed almost unnoticed amid the
general preoccupation with the Schuman Plan. This plan, in-
deed, was primarily concerned with the problem of integrating
Germany with the rest of Western Europe and attempting to
prevent a resurgence of the German menace. Hence it must
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456 WORLD POLITICS
be considered as having at least an indirect bearing on the
question of German rearmament but lies somewhat outside
the scope of the present discussion.
However, it was not long before the sequence of events in
the Far East introduced a note of urgency into the general
search for security, and the nations of Western Europe, shiver-
ing in the icy blasts of the Korean War, began anxiously to
look around for warmer clothing. In the House of Commons
on July 26, Mr. Churchill, unable to resist the fresh tempta-
tion to play his familiar role of the Cassandra of the twentieth
century, referred again to the problem of German rearma-
ment. "It is five months now since I raised the question," he
said. "The Prime Minister called me irresponsible when I
did so. . . . Perhaps it is better to be irresponsible and right,
than to be responsible and wrong."
Shortly after this sally, Mr. Churchill attended the Assem-
bly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg. In the course of this
session he moved, and the Assembly passed, a resolution which
deserves a fairly detailed examination.
T H E STRASBOURG RESOLUTION AND THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY
The text of this resolution runs briefly as follows:
The Assembly, in order to express its devotion to the maintenance of
peace, and its resolve to sustain the action of the Security Council of the
United Nations . . . calls for the immediate creation under the authority
of a European Minister of Defense, of a European army, subject to
proper unified democratic control and acting in full co-operation with
the U.S.A. and Canada.
[Passed, August 11, 1950: 89 to 5, with 27 abstentions.]
Several aspects of the proceedings leading up to this reso-
lution and of those that followed it, as well as its actual word-
ing and the general reactions to it, are most interesting. Not
the least remarkable is perhaps the fact that, since it is ex-
pressly stated in Article 1, Paragraph 4 of the Statute of the
Council that "questions pertaining to national defense are
outside the competence of the Council," it is highly doubtful
whether the Assembly had any business to discuss the subjects
at all.
So far as the actual wording of the resolution is concerned, it
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WEST GERMAN REARMAMENT 457
is worth noting that the phrase "under the authority of a
European Minister of Defense" was inserted into the original
draft of the text in order to meet the wishes of the former
French foreign minister, Georges Bidault, one of the French
representatives at the Assembly. The voting on the motion is
also revealing. In the first place, owing to the large number
of abstentions, the resolution barely gained the necessary two-
thirds majority. These abstentions were composed of the repre-
sentatives of Sweden and the Federal German Republic, who
declined to vote on the ground that their countries were not
members of the Atlantic Pact, and of a number of Labor
representatives from the United Kingdom, the reasons for
whose abstention were shortly to be made clear. The votes cast
against the motion came from one British Labor member, and
from four members from the republic of Eire, who, although
their country was also not a member of the Atlantic Pact, never-
theless felt obliged by reason of Britain's role as an occupying
power in the partition of Ireland to vote against the Churchill
resolution.
The Assembly, however, having ventured so far into the
forbidden territory of defense, proved reluctant to trespass
any further. On August 16 two British representatives sup-
ported by members from Norway, Denmark, and Iceland ex-
pressed their objections to any renewed discussion on the sub-
ject as follows: "As responsible members of our Parliaments
we cannot now vote for, or accept, plans which might conflict
with plans already being carried out or already made. So far
as we, as Members of the Atlantic Pact, are concerned, we
must now leave this question to our governments and to the
organs of the Atlantic Pact." In deference to such objections,
the subject was, in fact, dropped, but not before there had
appeared in the ranks of the partisans of Western defense a
confusion that was soon to become worse confounded. Many
clearly preferred to regard the existing North Atlantic Treaty
Organization as providing the best prospects for an integrated
defense of Europe, and to concentrate their efforts in this di-
rection. On the other hand there were signs that, for whatever
reason, others had higher hopes of some as yet unspecified
machinery for defense that might one day be evolved around
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458 WORLD POLITICS
the still insecure framework of the Council of Europe. The
London Times, indeed, commenting on the resolution, pointed
out "how early the Assembly can overlap work already being
done elsewhere," and stated that "in the subsequent debate
there was little to suggest that the N.A.T.O. is already striv-
ing to create a collective force broader and more powerful
than the one which many hearers took Mr. Churchill to
mean."
Mr. Churchill had devoted much of his speech to Germany:
"I have heard it said," he stated, "that if any Germans, except
Communists, were to be armed, this might be the pretext of
a preventive war on the part of Russia; believe me, the long
calculated designs of the Soviet government will not be timed
or deflected by events of this order." He asked the Assembly to
"assure our German friends that we shall hold their safety
and freedom as sacred as our own." Although in the course of
his speech he omitted to mention Germany as one of the nations
who should contribute to the suggested European army, he
later made it clear that he had intended to do so. In Washing-
ton at least there seemed to be no doubt of his meaning. Spokes-
men were "encouraged" to see the idea of German rearmament
originating in Europe, particularly under the patronage of
"such a good European" as Mr. Churchill. Though reluctant
to permit the rise of a German nationalist army, they had
realized the impossibility of producing the necessary man-
power without one; "but a German component of a European
army would be an entirely different matter, and one which
would receive general support in Washington."
The European idea, indeed, might seem to be making up
for the setback that it had received over the Schuman Plan, and
we shall presently see what inspiration the French govern-
ment was to draw from the Assembly's resolution. Exactly
what impetus this resolution did give to the speeding up of
Western defense it is very difficult to assess, but it is not impos-
sible that the ultimate judgment will be that, in other respects,
it has done as much to confuse the cause of Europe as to pro-
mote it.
Meanwhile, Dr. Adenauer, his confidence regained, re-
entered the discussion. On August 17, after talks with the three
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Allied High Commissioners on the security of Western Ger-
many, with particular reference to a possible increase in the
normal police forces of the Republic, he held a press confer-
ence at which he outlined the proposals he had made. These
were seen to include not only the strengthening of the existing
police but also the drafting of more Allied troops to Germany
to form a screen behind which could be recruited a special
force of German volunteers of the same size and strength
as the "people's police" of the Eastern zone. This, Dr. Aden-
auer argued, would not constitute a measure of remilitariza-
tion. Official comment on these proposals was, however,
reserved. An American spokesman confined himself to the
statement that "the Western world is studying ways of strength-
ening the defense of democracy; as a part of Europe, Germany
will obviously play a role." The only immediate result was that
the Federal Republic was authorized to recruit an additional
10,000 men for the normal police forces.
In fact, Dr. Adenauer's suggestion might be considered a
tall order. The "people's police," whose exact strength is un-
known, may well soon number as many as 300,000 men; it
has tanks and artillery, as well as embryo naval and air forces,
and "can only be distinguished from any army proper by the
fact that it draws its petrol from a public garage and gets its
food supplies from the grocer and the butcher." Even if, as
the Chancellor maintained, the idea of the re-establishment
of a Wehrmacht was far from the thoughts of the Federal
Government, the Bundestag, and the German people, and even
if the uncomfortable word "remilitarization" could be avoided,
permission could not lightly be granted to the Bonn govern-
ment for the formation of an equivalent of the Bereitschaften
in Western Germany.
Yet it seemed hard to deny Dr. Adenauer's contention that
the present police force was utterly inadequate, even for the
internal security of the German Republic. At the end of
August he reiterated his anxiety in a memorandum presented
to the High Commissioners, the purport of which seems to
have been: first, that the Western powers must increase their
forces in Western Germany; second, that some sort of protec-
tive police force was strongly desired by the Federal Govern-
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ment; and third, that the Republic would consider the question
of a possible German contribution to a European army.
The Western powers, indeed, were faced with a serious
dilemma. On the one hand, the possible menace that German
arms might present in the future could not, in the light of past
experience, be forgotten; and even though Germany's im-
mediate might, like the menace, was strangely small, it still
had to be guarded against by every means. But on the other
hand, if adequate provision in terms of combatant units to hold
aggression on the frontiers of Western Germany could not be
made without some use of German manpower, the fact must
be faced. Moreover, Dr. Adenauer seemed to lack conviction
that the reaction of the Western powers would be prompt
enough, even in the case of a crossing of the frontier by East
German forces. In addition to the visible reassurance that
some sort of West German force would provide for the Ger-
mans themselves, the occupying powers might find themselves
in an awkward situation if they had to defend the frontiers of
the Federal Republic without German assistance in a war of
"liberation" launched by other Germans.
It seemed in fact as if a great deal were going to depend
upon the results of the meetings, due to be held shortly in New
York, of the three Foreign Ministers of the United States, the
United Kingdom, and France, and of the twelve Foreign Min-
isters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. As yet, in-
deed, there was some reluctance on the part of official circles
to state definitely that the question of Germany's part in the
active defense of the West was to be discussed at these meet-
ings ; but it was clear that, since the main theme of these talks
was to be the security of Western Europe, the problem was
unlikely to be overlooked even if it could not immediately be
answered.
Meanwhile, various Atlantic Pact governments began to
announce their individual programs of rearmament. At the
end of August, the British government indicated its intention
to increase the period of compulsory military service to two
years, and Belgium and France shortly afterwards also an-
nounced increases in the length of service. The French an-
nouncement is interesting, not only because it was seen that
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the government had not felt sufficiently secure to introduce
an increase from one year to two years, but had compromised
by lengthening the period to eighteen months—and not only
because no alteration had been made in the basic pay, of six
francs per day, of the conscripts, but particularly on account
of the wording of Premier Pleven's speech on this occasion.
The French Premier, after emphasizing the need for the free
peoples of Western Europe to build up a covering force, stated
that any threat to the security of Western Germany would be
a threat to the security of France as well. The existence of the
"people's police," he went on, and the fact that Western Ger-
many, whose political tendencies had been demonstrated in free
elections, had no such force, would be taken into account in
considering Dr. Adenauer's request for a stronger police force.
And finally he made the significant statement that the Schuman
Plan was an attempt to deal with the root causes of insecurity,
and that kind of approach might be profitable as a means of
preventing other sources of conflict.
In the United States also, the pace was quickening. Presi-
dent Truman, fresh from announcing that the strength of the
United States armed forces was to be increased to three million
men, held talks on the question of Germany's part in the
scheme of defense with High Commissioner McCloy, who
had come to Washington with the text of Dr. Adenauer's
memorandum. After these talks, Mr. McCloy said that it had
been agreed that "in some manner and some form the West
Germans should be enabled, if they want to, to defend their
own country." Both form and manner remained so far unspeci-
fied, but it was generally known that American opinion was
strongly opposed to matching Russian dishonesty with a West
German army disguised as a federal police force, which had
in effect been the course suggested by the German chancellor.
Nor did many appear inclined to accept either the view, ex-
pressed in an ingenious but unconvincing article in Figaro,
that Europe could be defended without calling upon either
American or German troops, or the declaration of Wilhelm
Pieck, the East German president, that "war can be averted
if mankind, including the German people, stand together for
peace, and force the Anglo-Americans to leave Germany as
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soon as possible." On September 10, in fact, President Truman
announced that there were to be "substantial increases" in the
strength of American forces in Western Europe; and the
following day Mr. Acheson gained the approval of his Con-
gressional committees for the proposals that he was to lay be-
fore the British and French Foreign Ministers at their meet-
ing in New York on September 12.
T H E ACHESON PROPOSALS FOR GERMAN REARMAMENT
These proposals, although all discussion of them had taken
place in closed session, had become something of an open se-
cret, at least in their broad outline. The burden of them seems
to have been that Western Germany should be included in the
scheme of defense of the West, with French and British con-
sent, through a combined European force of which the Ger-
mans would form a subordinate part—in other words, German
troops should somehow be included in the integrated forces
of NATO. The proposals were not detailed, but they appear
to envisage the raising of small units at first and ultimately
units up to divisional strength, while guarding against any
possible revival of the German general staff. The United States,
in fact, now expressed her conviction that in spite of the addi-
tional American commitments for the defense of Europe, and
in spite of all that Britain and France had also undertaken to
do, there was nevertheless no possibility of holding the fron-
tiers of Western Germany against aggression without further
assistance to be provided by the Germans themselves.
This was indeed a momentous decision, and not lightly to
be taken. Clearly it is not yet possible to say with any cer-
tainty why it was made, but I believe it is possible to deduce
motives that are inherently probable, if nothing more. In this
connection, it is of the utmost importance to appreciate the
relationship between governmental policy and military strat-
egy. Policy is the dominant, strategy the subordinate, element;
it is the province of policy to determine the ends, and the duty
of strategy to supply the means. Policy, indeed, may well
define an end that lies beyond the reach of the available means,
and in such a case some compromise must be effected. Either
the end must be modified, or the means must somehow be in-
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creased. But it is policy that decides whether the price that
must be paid for this increase is a price that is justified by the
importance of the end, or whether a less ambitious end should
be defined.
In this case the end, which is the defense of Western Europe,
is of paramount importance, not only to the countries of
Western Europe themselves, but also, for economic as well
as for political reasons, to the United States; and it is not an
end that will admit of modification. Even though, from a
purely military point of view, it might be preferable that
Western Europe should be defended on the Rhine, to adopt
such a course would be to deliver the Federal Republic and
the industrial resources of Western Germany as an easy prize
to any aggressor from the East. If nothing else, it is of the
greatest importance to the Western Allies that they should be
able to deny these industrial resources to Russia, even if they
cannot make full use of them themselves.
But if the Americans had decided that the defense of Europe
was to be the end, they had also decided that the existing means
were inadequate. This deficiency could only be made good
in one of two ways: either the Allied powers must make still
greater increases in their own programs of rearmament, or
some acceptable way must be found whereby the Germans
themselves could be armed. Military necessity demanded a
choice between these two alternatives, but only policy could
make that choice. The choice that Mr. Acheson went to New
York to advocate must be taken as evidence that, in the eyes
of the United States government, the disadvantages of increas-
ing the rearmament commitments of the Allied powers out-
weighed the disadvantages of rearming Germany. Indeed, it
is possible to find some advantages of a positive nature in the
latter course. It can for instance be argued that to arm German
units would give the Germans a stake in their own defense
and would bolster up morale; but it can hardly be maintained
that these rather problematical benefits would of themselves
be sufficient to justify the choice. The real question was which
of the two evils was the lesser.
Mr. Acheson, however, was at first to find some difficulty in
persuading his French and British colleagues to agree, not only
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that his proposals provided a suitable means of implementing
the American choice of German rearmament, but even that
it was necessary to make such a choice at all. For even if
Mr. Bevin and M. Schuman had come to New York prepared
to find the subject of German rearmament on the agenda of
their meeting, it is unlikely that they had expected to find it
presented in such a concrete form. In fact, shortly before the
meeting, M. Schuman had expressed his belief that although
the internal security of Germany was the responsibility of the
Germans, external security was the responsibility of the Allies.
Moreover, owing to the altered circumstances, the Allies them-
selves were not adequately equipped, he said, and their needs
must inevitably take priority before there could be any ques-
tion of arming the Germans as well.
At any event, the Foreign Ministers' meeting was adjourned
after three days, in order to enable the British and French
representatives to consult their governments and the High
Commissioners. Although the meeting of the NATO For-
eign Ministers began immediately afterwards, it was clear that
no decision could be reached at this meeting until the three
Great Powers were also in agreement. Indeed, there were signs
of uncertainty in the ranks of the "Little Nine" also, although
Lester Pearson, the Canadian Secretary for External Affairs,
stated categorically that "the time has come to rearm the West
Germans because the East Germans are already armed." So
the Atlantic Pact council was also adjourned for governmental
consultations, and the interim communique, while welcoming
the formation of "an integrated military force, adequate for
the defense of Europe," made no mention of the subject of
German rearmament.
On September 18 the three Foreign Ministers resumed their
meeting, which ended the same day, when the following state-
ment was issued:
In the spirit of the new relationship which they wish to establish with
the Federal Republic, the three Governments have decided . . . to take
the necessary steps . . . to terminate the state of war with Germany as soon
as possible. . . . To make the protection of the free world, including the
German Republic, more effective, the Allied Governments will increase
their forces in Germany. They will treat any attack against the Federal
Republic or Berlin, from any quarter, as an attack upon themselves. The
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Ministers are fully agreed that the re-creation of a German national army
would not serve the best interests of Germany or Europe; they also be-
lieve that this is the view of the great majority of the German people.
The Ministers have however taken note of sentiments recently expressed
in Germany and elsewhere in favor of German participation in the com-
mon defense of European freedom. The questions raised by the problems
of such participation are at present the subject of study and exchange
of views.
Inconclusive as this statement is on the subject of German
rearmament, it is too much to say that nothing had been
achieved. In fact, agreement had been reached in so far as
the policy itself was concerned, but no agreement had been
reached for the provision of the necessary means. The key
to this lay in the French attitude, for it seems clear that the
British government had substantially accepted the American
point of view. The French had indeed their reasons for fear-
ing a revival of the German menace, and they could with
justice maintain that there did not yet exist any integrated
force into which the Germans could be fitted. However, the
formation of such a force had been under discussion since May,
under the auspices of the Atlantic Pact, and it had looked as
if an agreement were about to be concluded. To American and
British eyes at least, it appeared as if a tightly knit Atlantic
alliance should be strong enough to control and direct the
form of any German contribution to defense. It was natural
that they should consider the Strasbourg resolution as an in-
vitation to proceed with German rearmament along the lines
of the Atlantic Pact. It was no less natural that the United
States should press for an immediate decision, in order that
German units might be fitted into the integrated force from
the moment of its inception.
The French, however, if they had accepted the ultimate
necessity of some form of German rearmament, did not yet
seem to believe that it was a matter of immediate urgency;
nor were they convinced that an organization within the frame-
work of the Atlantic Pact, such as had been envisaged in Mr.
Acheson's proposals, would provide the best answer to the
problem. An article which appeared after the New York meet-
ings in the paper Le Petit Bleu du Cote du Nord, of which
M. Pleven is the political director, remarked that "the prob-
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lem whether Germany's contribution can at this stage take
the form of military units within a Western force cannot
hastily be resolved." The article went on to suggest an approach
to Russia to find out her real intentions concerning rearma-
ment, a suggestion which indicated the French government's
desire to carry the greatest possible weight of popular opinion
with it.
The French government, indeed, now found itself in a most
awkward situation, and so far there seemed to be no way out.
However, it remained adamant in its objections to the Ache-
son proposals, and further conferences in New York were
unable to make much headway. On September 24, the meeting
between the Foreign Ministers and Defense Ministers of the
three powers ended with another guarded statement. But the
result can be gauged from a comment made by Jules Moch, the
French Minister of Defense. Concerning Mr. Bevin's state-
ment that "advances have been made on the general problem
of building up the forces of the West," M. Moch said: "It is
possible that from the standpoint of Britain some advances
have been made." Similarly, the adjourned meeting of the
Atlantic Pact Foreign Ministers ended in a communique to
the effect that "the council was in agreement that Germany
should be enabled to contribute to the build-up of the defense
of Western Europe, and, noting that the occupying powers
were studying the matter, requested the Defense Committee
to make recommendations at the earliest possible date as to
methods by which Germany could most usefully make its
contribution."
The result of the New York conferences was, in fact, a dead-
lock. But if the primary point at issue between the United
States and Britain on the one hand and France on the other
was the vexed question of the German contribution to the in-
tegrated defense of Europe, this deadlock had the doubly
unfortunate effect of preventing the implementation of any
integrated scheme of defense as well, since the United States
seemed determined to hold out for a decision on the German
question first. The question, once raised, could not be shelved,
for it was obvious that neither the United States nor the
countries of Europe were likely to give their wholehearted
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support to a scheme which would, by implication, be inade-
quate unless it included a German contribution. It was com-
mon knowledge that it was the French attitude that was re-
sponsible for the delay, and the position of the French govern-
ment was highly embarrassing. Public opinion in France, for
reasons that were emotional as much as political, was deeply
suspicious of the idea of German rearmament, and there was
moreover a general election in the offing. But if the coalition
government did not feel that it could safely accept the Ache-
son proposals, for reasons of internal and of external policy,
there was nevertheless a grave danger that prolonged disagree-
ment might bring about a serious division in the ranks of the
Western Allies. Already, at home and abroad, French intransi-
gence was being criticized, and there can be little doubt that
the Prague proposals for a German settlement, issued on Octo-
ber 21 after the meeting between Mr. Molotov and the For-
eign Ministers of eight satellite states, were designed to take
advantage of this rift. In an effort to recover the initiative, the
French Council of Ministers approved, on October 23, the
text of an alternative proposal for German rearmament which
was announced in the National Assembly the following day
by M. Pleven, and which is generally known as the Pleven Plan.
T H E PLEVEN PLAN
The substance of the Pleven Plan may be outlined briefly
as follows. It envisages the creation of a European army under
the direction of a European Minister of Defense, who would
be nominated by the governments concerned and be responsi-
ble to a European assembly. This assembly could be either
the Strasbourg Assembly or an emanation of it, or an assembly
of specially elected representatives. The Minister would have
the same tasks as a national minister of defense, but on the
larger scale implied by a European union, and he would carry
out the directives of a defense council made up of ministers
from the participating countries. The contingents to be fur-
nished by the member countries, including Germany, "would
be incorporated in the European army on the level of the
smallest possible unit," and the financing of this army would
be carried out through a common budget.
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In his speech, M. Pleven said that the plan was designed to
enable Germany to furnish her contribution to putting Western
Europe in a state of defense. He stressed the danger of the
constitution of German divisions and a German War Minis-
try as tending sooner or later to the reconstitution of a national
army and to the revival of German militarism. He further
emphasized the need for a transitory period and insisted that
the creation of a unified army should in no way hold up
the execution of programs either laid down or actually being
carried out by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. But,
he said, as soon as the Schuman Plan had been signed, the
French government would invite Great Britain and the free
countries of continental Europe who might agree, to study
the matter in Paris on the basis of the French proposals. Before
the ballot on the motion, he assured the Assembly that the
other Atlantic Pact states would have to accept this basic
principle for a European army, or France would maintain her
opposition to giving arms to the Bonn government. It is in-
teresting to note in passing that whereas the motion "approving
the Government's statement" was passed by 349 votes to 235,
the motion approving its determination "not to allow the re-
vival of the German army and general staflf" was passed by 402
votes to 168.
Whatever else may be the result of the Pleven Plan, it had
made clear the fundamental difference of approach to the
problem of Western defense between the nations of the Con-
tinent on the one hand, and those outside it, a category
that seems at present to number the United Kingdom among its
members, on the other hand. In the preamble to the Pleven
Plan it is expressly stated that this suggestion "has been directly
inspired by the resolution of the Council of Europe of August
11, 1950." But the French interpretation of the Strasbourg
resolution clearly differs widely from the American. Those
outside the Continent believe that the most certain means of
averting aggression is to achieve the greatest possible increase
in strength in the shortest possible time, and they are not im-
mediately concerned with the problem of what may happen
once this aim has been achieved. The Continental, living in
the shadow of European history, inevitably thinks of the situ-
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ation with which Europe will be faced when the bond created
by the Eastern menace has been loosened by the success of the
measures adopted to avert it.
Seen in this light, as an insistence on the need for a long-
term as well as a short-term policy, the Pleven Plan obviously
should not be disregarded. What value it possesses as a contri-
bution to the immediate needs of Europe is another question.
The reception which it received in the United States and in
Britain was far from encouraging. In London, the Times
pointed out that it was not "in any sense a practical contribu-
tion to the immediate discussion," and emphasized that this
military version of the Schuman Plan raised again all the dif-
ficulties of the federalist solution that had been encountered
at Strasbourg, apart from its defect of being "a long-term
answer to a short-term problem." In New York, the Herald
Tribune said that the French had "come up with an answer
to the problem of German rearmament which must baffle their
best friends," and added that "the plain fact is . . . that if the
French conditions were to prevail German arms would not be
incorporated in the Western defense system in time to be of
much use." On both the military and on the political side, the
scheme was felt in many quarters to contain serious flaws. Not
the least of these was the fact that the proposal for the cre-
ation of a European Minister of Defense, carried to its logical
conclusion, meant the establishment of a European State, if the
post was to have any reality. And if this was the case, it was
clear, not only that such a Federal State could not be brought
into being in one year, or even in two years, but also that there
was a strong possibility that such a federation, if eventually
realized, was unlikely to include Great Britain and several
other European countries among its members. In this event,
the divergent approaches to the problems of Western defense,
and the duplication of organizations, would inevitably be
perpetuated.
But whatever the technical objections that may be raised
against the Pleven Plan, it must nevertheless be considered as
a notable, if idealistic, attempt to solve a fundamental problem.
It is not fair to dismiss it as being simply an expedient intro-
duced in an effort to gain time, or to accuse the French gov-
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ernment of insincerity, for there were signs that French policy
had been feeling its way towards a proposal of this sort for
some time. But the great weakness of the Pleven Plan, at
least in American and in British eyes, was that it raised ques-
tions which only time could answer. Although M. Pleven de-
clared that the creation of a unified army on the lines he
suggested should not hold up work already in progress under
the Atlantic Pact, it is hard to believe that he did not foresee
that only further delay could be the result of his proposals,
particularly in view of the inflexible way in which discussions
on the subject had been handled by M. Moch. While delay
may at times be useful as providing leisure for reflection and
may prevent the hasty adoption of a course that would later be
regretted, there were in this case several reasons why it might
prove dangerous, if not fatal.
Most obvious of these was the fact that the more time was
spent in discussion, the longer Europe would have to remain
in a state of inadequate defense. There was a real danger that
any prolonged failure to arrive at a decision would have an
adverse effect on the forces of public opinion, both in America
and in Germany. What the effect in Germany might be, I
hope presently to show, but in the United States there were
already signs that patience would not last forever. Some of
Mr. Acheson's advisers were said to have been in favor of
bringing pressure to bear on France by threatening to withhold
American financial aid. On the other hand there was always
a possibility that American opinion, disgusted at the continu-
ation of the deadlock, might begin to feel inclined to leave the
Europeans to their own devices.
In fact, the immediate result of the enunciation of the
Pleven Plan was to introduce an air of unreality into the meet-
ing of the Defense Committee of the Atlantic Pact, which
opened in Washington on October 27. Although M. Moch
pressed for the adoption of his government's proposals, he
emphasized that only their details could be modified, while
the principles could not be altered. The committee, having
no authority to discuss the political questions involved, clearly
could not come to any decisions of importance. Emanuel Shin-
well, the British Defense Minister, had announced on his ar-
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rival in the United States: "It is time we got down to business—
the longer we delay the worse it will be for every one of us."
After the conference was over, he was forced to admit that "we
made some progress . . . but not enough to satisfy me."
There were signs that a compromise had been worked out
on a point of detail, the size of the units that Germany should
contribute to whatever scheme might eventually be adopted;
but M. Schuman's speech in the November session of the
Council of Europe seemed to indicate that any compromise
on matters of principle was far from being reached.
In this speech, delivered on November 24, M. Schuman said
that the French proposals were not intended as a dilatory ma-
neuver or as an involved subterfuge. Military problems in Eu-
rope had arisen sooner than France would have wished, for
she would have liked to build up first the economic and po-
litical bases before tackling the military structure. "We want
a defense organization on a European basis," he went on,
"because we see no other possible solution to the German prob-
lem." In the French plan, there was to be no national army or
armament; Europe as a whole would be armed, not individual
European states. Replying to those who said that a European
organization was unnecessary and that Germany could be in-
tegrated in an Atlantic Pact force, M. Schuman maintained
that this only involved the institution of a unified command
while allowing the survival of national armies. "The Atlantic
Pact," he said, "has a temporary aim. The European army
in our view is a permanent solution, and must insure peace
against all threats, internal or external, now and in the future."
What would be the wider repercussions of this speech, and
of the resolution calling for German participation in Western
defense within the framework of a united European force
which was passed by the Assembly later in the same session, it
was too early yet to say. In the light of subsequent ministerial
statements in the House of Commons, however, it must be
taken as certain that the British government for one would
not accept its implications. Yet if the proposals for a degree
of German rearmament within the organization of the Atlantic
Pact did not, in spite of all that had been said, provide ade-
quate safeguards against the possible resurrection of a German
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national army, as M. Schuman contended, this was clearly a
serious deficiency, and one that must somehow be remedied
if these proposals were to be implemented. At the moment the
only way to a solution satisfactory to the Western Allies seemed
to lie through a compromise whereby France could agree to
accept the signature of the Schuman Plan as a sufficient guaran-
tee against a revival of the German menace, and so could allow
the resumption of a progress along the lines of the Atlantic
Pact.
T H E ATTITUDE OF THE GERMANS
Unfortunately, even if the Western Allies should succeed
in reconciling their private differences and in evolving a satis-
factory compromise, there would still remain one final prob-
lem to be settled. It was becoming clear that this problem, of
persuading the Germans themselves to accept whatever form
of rearmament the Allies might agree upon, was likely to
prove no easier to resolve than the other problems which Ger-
man rearmament had raised. It was not until this stage in the
discussions among the Western powers that any serious con-
sideration appears to have been given to the position of the
West Germans. There existed and still exists in Germany a
considerable body of opinion which acknowledged, or per-
haps even welcomed, the necessity for a German contribution
to Western defense, but it was evident that there were also
powerful forces that were opposed to the idea, forces that
were both moral and political in their origins.
Although these forces are naturally closely interconnected,
for the purposes of the present analysis it seems best to attempt
to consider them separately for the sake of clarity. To take
first the opposition to German rearmament that was based
on consideration of policy, it appears that this also had a
double character. On the one hand, there were what may be
called the negative objections. Chief of these was the fear
of a possible resurgence of the militaristic element, which is
probably dreaded as much by the Germans as it is by the
French. There was also the well-founded fear that in the event
of aggression from the East and a resultant war, Germany
would become the battleground of Europe. However, these
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objections were capable of being overcome once a satisfactory
and sufficient scheme of Western defense was seen to be in
prospect. What were more serious were the positive objections,
the nature of which can best be illustrated by quoting some ex-
tracts from a statement made, on August 23, by Kurt Schu-
macher, the chairman of the Social Democratic Party.
Commenting on Dr. Adenauer's suggestion, after the passing
of the Strasbourg resolution, that Germany should make some
contribution to her own defense, Dr. Schumacher said:
I can see no political foundation for this unsolicited offer. We are
throwing away the last trump out of our hand which we need in order
to achieve certain things—for example decisive alterations in the Occupa-
tion Statute, and in the Ruhr Statute, and certain adjustments with re-
gard to the security authorities. . . . Democracy should defend Germany
on the offensive in the East. . . . The plans for a direct military or in-
direct police rearmament of Germany have a purely defensive charac-
ter. The supposition is that a great deal will be given up, above all that
Berlin will be given up. German Social Democracy cannot agree to such
a policy. Democracy's counter-thrust must seek and achieve a decision
on the Niemen or the Vistula. Nothing else will serve as a successful
defense, only as the certain destruction of Germany. The Social Demo-
crats' point of view is the way of getting the necessary pressure to bear
on the United States and other democratic powers and to take from them
every possibility of evasion or excuse.
This statement, incidentally, is described in the official intro-
duction as being of "fundamental significance for future pol-
icy."
But whatever the full implications of this speech, it does,
I think, indicate that there was in Germany a widespread re-
luctance to accept rearmament, based on fears that to do so
would involve accepting the permanence of the Oder-Neisse
line, and also perhaps a final division of the country between
East and West. Not only this, but there was also a strong
feeling that if rearmament was to be accepted, it could be only
on terms laid down by the Germans themselves. This danger
had been pointed out by the author of a commentary in the
New Statesman, who added, "The more the Western Allies em-
phasise their military weakness, the harsher will be Germany's
conditions for consenting to be rearmed." This attitude, which
could also be detected in some of Dr. Adenauer's statements
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on the subject, might have a certain amount of justice on its
side, but it was evident that nothing but harm could result if
German politicians were tempted to resort to what could only
be called political blackmail.
What was probably the most fundamental difficulty that
would have to be overcome was the "moral disarmament" of
modern Germany. The harsh consequences of two military de-
feats had undoubtedly left a great many Germans in a pacifist
and defeatist mood. Since 1945 the policy of the occupying
powers had been to discourage them from ever again putting
their faith in arms. Evidence of this state of mind is abundant,
and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung brought out well the
irony of the Strasbourg resolution. "A German," it commented,
"who, five years ago, did not give up his rusty cavalry sword,
but buried it in his garden, was reckoned a Nazi and an enemy
of democracy. A German who today says he has no liking for
carrying a rifle, and that he will put on a steel helmet with
distaste, is again regarded as a bad democrat." The views of
Pastor Martin Niemoller, who would compound with Com-
munism in order to save the unity of the Evangelical Church,
were no doubt extreme and unrepresentative. However senti-
ments such as those voiced by Professor Schmid, the third
leader of the S.D.P., that he would rather be "Bolshevized
as an entire being in an entire house than as a cripple in a
trench" could not be dismissed entirely. And the Communists,
who fondly wish to see the Ruhr become the arsenal of the
"People's Democracies," were finding useful allies in the leth-
argy and fatalism of many Germans. This "moral disarma-
ment" was not indeed confined to Germany, but it was in
Germany that it presented the most serious obstacle to the
solidarity of Western defense.
All these forces had certainly made their presence felt in
the results of the various German elections of late 1950. How-
ever in trying to assess how far the swing away from the
Christian Democratic Union represented a vote against re-
armament, there are two other factors that must be taken into
account. The first is that not only had local issues played a
large part in these elections, but the economic policies of the
Federal Government had also been the cause of some discon-
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tent. Hence the loss of ground by the government parties can-
not be regarded as having been brought about by the
rearmament question alone. The second factor is the peculiar
advantage that was enjoyed by S.D.P. in the prevailing con-
ditions of uncertainty. Although Dr. Schumacher campaigned,
not against rearmament, but against rearmament before the
people had been consulted in a general election, it seems to be
the case that his party, as a result of his associations with
Pastor Niemoller and the speeches of Professor Schmid, had
come to be regarded as the party of "no more soldiering."
And whereas the government parties suffered from the handi-
cap that no concrete military proposals had yet been placed
before them, the opposition were able to talk in general terms
and could develop the ever popular theme that the Germans
were being exploited or imposed upon.
The election results could not therefore be considered as a
reliable indication of the strength of German opposition to
rearmament any more than could the various unofficial polls
and surveys of public opinion that had been conducted. There
was evidently a feeling, based both on idealism and self-
interest, in favor of taking some responsibility for the defense
of the West, and few political leaders seemed to disagree with
Dr. Adenauer that if the Atlantic community needed the Ger-
mans, the Germans also needed the Atlantic community. Yet
it was clear that the Germans were far from being ready to
take up their arms again. Before this end could be achieved,
the consent, not only of the Allies, not only of the Bonn
government, but of the German people themselves, would
have to be obtained. Obviously this would require more time
and perhaps more tact than had originally been thought neces-
sary. But meanwhile not only had the allies failed to come
to a decision among themselves, so that all progress towards
a real integration of Western defense remained obstructed, but
this failure was also increasing German anxiety and the politi-
cal uncertainty that went with it. The hesitations of the Ger-
mans about rearmament, reflected in the difficulties en-
countered in reaching agreement on a revised Occupation
Statute, tended to grow with the delay on the part of the
Western powers in making known their intentions about de-
fense.
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T H E APPOINTMENT OF A SUPREME COMMANDER
Clearly the time had come when if the lost momentum
was to be regained, some sort of compromise must be effected.
The Times commenting on M. Pleven's visit to London early
in December, forecast something of the kind. "The French
government," it said, "is likely to agree that rearmament in
Western Europe, therefore involving Germany in some de-
gree, must proceed without further loss of time, while their
Allies will agree that French consent does not prejudice the
chances of working out a form of European defense organiza-
tion which will meet their security requirements and further
the military integration of Europe."
The first steps towards this necessary compromise, upon
which so much appeared to turn, were made when the Atlan-
tic Council deputies met under the chairmanship of Charles
M. Spofford during the first week of December. It adopted
a plan which was immediately approved by the French coun-
cil of ministers, "providing for a transitional solution, pend-
ing the conclusion of negotiations on the creation of a European
army." This, on the face of it, might seem as if the French
government had in all but name abandoned their previous
position. As Le Monde pointed out, "It is not only in France
that temporary solutions become permanent." It was feared
by some that the French concession would bring about exactly
what the French had been at such pains to avoid—the creation
of a German army before the framework of a European army
could come into being. The United States had made it clear
that the nomination of a Supreme Commander depended on
the solution of the German rearmament issue, which had been
held up by French objections. These had now, apparently, been
overcome, and even though France was still determined to
press on with her plan for a European army, which had Ameri-
can support, this was an idea which was known to raise grave
doubts in the minds of several continental countries.
But there were at the same time signs that the French "con-
cessions" were not in fact so far-reaching as they might seem.
This became clear after the Brussels conference of the North
Atlantic Council and Defense Ministers. In the statement
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issued after the joint session of December 19, it was announced
that "the Council also reached unanimous agreement regarding
the part which Germany might assume in the common de-
fense," and "invited the governments of France, the United
Kingdom and the U.S.A. to explore this matter with the gov-
ernment of the Federal German Republic."
But the chief achievement of the Brussels conference, and
the one which caused the most widespread satisfaction, was the
appointment of General Eisenhower as Commander-in-Chief
of NATO forces. This appointment can hardly be said to have
come as a surprise, but was none the less welcome, signifying
as it did to many Europeans a further commitment by the
United States to Western Europe.
This change of emphasis caused particular satisfaction in
France. The agreement on the appointment of a Supreme Com-
mander before the rearmament of Germany was embarked
upon was felt to underline the priority of strengthening exist-
ing Western forces which had long been pressed for in Paris.
That the emphasis at Brussels had been laid on the creation
of an Atlantic force, while the question of German rearmament
might almost be said to have figured as a minor issue, helped
to allay the French fear of taking any steps which might be
interpreted by Russia as a fait accompli prejudicial to any
fruitful discussion at a four-power conference. For, on the
French side at least, the course of events must be considered to
some extent in the light of two separate, but closely related,
Russian notes. The first, delivered on November 3, called for a
four-power conference on the German question, and the second,
of December 15, accused France and Britain of violating by
their agreement to German participation in the Western de-
fense plan the Potsdam agreement of 1945 on German demili-
tarization and the Anglo-Soviet and Franco-Soviet treaties
of friendship of 1942 and 1944.
It should not, however, be imagined that these Russian notes
were the only, or even the chief, reason for the evidently al-
tered approach to the question of German rearmament on the
part of the Western powers. For, even though the French gov-
ernment has naturally proved rather more sensitive to the
strictures of Moscow than has the American or British, yet
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the Brussels declaration did in itself provide clear evidence
that the Allies were not to be frightened into giving up the
substance for the shadow. As the Times commented, "the one
abiding condition of making the attempt to talk with Russia
is that the work of increasing the defensive strength of the
Western powers, upon which the chance of a settlement that
will be kept altogether depends, should go unslackened." The
Western reply, published on December 22, to the original
Soviet note proposing the basis of a four-power conference,
confirmed the Allied position.
The only German military force which exists at present is that
which has been for many months established in the Soviet zone, and which
is trained on military lines with artillery and tanks. If the participation of
German units in the defense of Western Germany is being discussed, it
is solely because Soviet policy and actions have compelled the other nations
to examine all means of improving their security. . . . The serious tension
which exists today springs neither from the question of the demilitarization
of Germany, nor from the German problem as a whole. It arises primarily
from the general attitude adopted by the Government of the U.S.S.R.
since the end of the war, and from the consequent international develop-
ments of recent months.
It cannot therefore fairly be maintained that the conference
at Brussels has resulted in a weakening of Allied determination,
or even in the "victory for French wisdom and caution" that
was hailed by the left-wing Franc-Tireur. What the Brussels
statement amounted to in fact was an admission that the ques-
tion, as originally posed, had been wrongly framed. The prob-
lem was not, and had never been, how best the supposedly will-
ing Germans might be allowed to rearm, but rather, how
best a reluctant Germany could be persuaded to accept her
rightful position in the mutual defense system of the Western
world. There can be little doubt that this admission chiefly
represents an adjustment in the American approach to the
problem. The United States, it was clear, had now realized
that the necessary negotiations with the Bonn government were
likely to be long and delicate, and that the consent of Germany
to her own rearmament was not rapidly to be obtained. In the
circumstances, there was nothing to be gained, and much to be
lost, by allowing the German problem further to obstruct the
closer integration of the NATO defenses, but it was in a
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sense accidental that American second thoughts corresponded
in this respect so closely with French wishes.
The nature of these second thoughts was concisely expressed
by General Eisenhower himself, in an interview shortly after
his new appointment had been announced. The Germans, he
said, had "a very special and difficult problem to decide. We
should not be too sure we know the answers for them before
they learn the answers themselves." And although, upon re-
flection, it might seem curious that the new Supreme Com-
mander had so thoroughly appreciated this all-important as-
pect of the problem which had, during the previous three
months, eluded so many of those concerned, it was evident
that his words represented the official policy of the Western
powers and of NATO. Whether this changed policy can
fairly be described as a compromise is debatable. It seems
rather to have been the outcome of a sounder understanding of
the facts of the case. But at least it could be hoped that the
integration of Western defense would again move forward
upon its interrupted course. It remained now to be seen what
steps the Atlantic powers would take to prove to Russia that
Stalin's words to Churchill in 1942 held equally true for 1951:
"Now that you have appointed a Supreme Commander, I
know that you mean business."
T H E SUPREME COMMANDER IN EUROPE
The news of the appointment of General Eisenhower and
the prospect now that some agreement had finally been
achieved, of giving substance to the Supreme Headquarters,
Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE), provided a much needed
impetus to the Western defense plans. Already, on December
20, it had been announced, by the consultative council of the
Brussels Treaty organization, that the military features of
Western Union were to be merged with the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization under the new Supreme Commander. And
although this decision did not mean that the military obliga-
tions of the Brussels treaty, which had always been more im-
mediately compelling than those of the Atlantic treaty, were
to be superseded, this and subsequent announcements testified
to the determination of the Atlantic Allies to put an end to
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existing duplications and ambiguities in the field of their de-
fensive plans.
Of still greater significance perhaps was the tour of the
Atlantic treaty countries undertaken by General Eisenhower
in the course of January. This tour, which took him through
France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway, the United
Kingdom, Portugal and Italy to Western Germany and back
to the United States via Luxembourg and Canada, was natur-
ally more of a brief preliminary survey than an exhaustive
investigation. But it was made the occasion for the announce-
ment of further significant defense increases on the part of
most of the nations concerned. How nearly the strength of
fifty or more divisions, and 5,000 or 6,000 aircraft that had
been estimated necessary, was likely to be achieved, it was still
too soon to say with any certainty. On February 1, if General
Eisenhower was not able to present to Congress a detailed
inventory of his discoveries in Europe, he had at least seen
enough to enable him to make a general profession of faith
in the worthiness of the cause. This profession, coupled with
the news of the improved situation in Korea, banished the
thesis that "Western Europe must create and equip huge num-
bers of fighting divisions of its own before we land another
man or another dollar on their shores" from the anterooms of
policy to the attics of history.
But although the effect of these developments in the broader
sphere of NATO had been temporarily to relegate the ques-
tion of German rearmament to second place, it was clear that
Germany was far from being forgotten. On the contrary, as
Mr. McCloy stated at a press conference on December 27, the
instructions of the High Commission were to go ahead with
defense negotiations with the Bonn government as a matter of
urgency. The Germans, he added, "should not now reckon
how little they can contribute, but how much." It had already
been announced on December 22 that a board of experts had
been formed to discuss the "scale and manner" of a possible
German contribution to Western defense. This was to con-
sist on the German side of three principal members, Herr
Theodor Blank, a Christian Democrat member of the Bundes-
tag, Herr Speidel, a former general and once Rommel's chief
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of staff, and Herr von Heusinger, another former general who
had been director of operations to the German High Com-
mand. The Allied representatives were apparently to be the
members of the Military Security Board. In Germany, the
news of the impending talks was received with satisfaction, al-
though it was felt that they were likely to be prolonged. Some
cynics were led to comment that it was a far cry from the days
when demilitarization ordinances forbade the making of toy
soldiers and tanks; but there was a general welcome for this
opportunity to state the German case, which had been neg-
lected hitherto.
These discussions, which were described as being "informal
talks at a technical level," were begun on January 9 and
continued at intervals throughout January and February.
Nevertheless it was clear that the question of German rearma-
ment remained a political and psychological rather than a
purely military issue, for physical factors would in any case
probably limit the size of the German contingents for some
time. Indeed, the British High Commissioner, Sir Ivone Kirk-
patrick, still felt it necessary, on January 12, to warn the Ger-
mans against "a policy of adventure, of playing off one power
against another," which "might seem attractive on a short-term
view, but would be disastrous in the end." He lamented the fact
that "the most popular speeches in the Bundestag, and in many
Landtage, are those which, ignoring Germany's dangerous
position, and without protest from any quarter, hurl reck-
less defiance at those countries on whom Germany's safety
and prosperity are most dependent."
The defense plans of the Allied powers, even before their
negotiations with Germany began had already depended upon
German assistance. Evidently what was now needed was some
means whereby the Allies, without slackening their determina-
tion, might regain the initiative, and this General Eisenhower
set himself to bring about. In the course of his visit to Western
Germany, the Supreme Commander on January 20 attended a
reception given by the American High Commissioner, at
which he had an opportunity to meet members of the German
defense committee. His appointment to the leadership of
NATO forces had originally been received less enthusiastically
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482 WORLD POLITICS
in Germany than elsewhere, but the general now did much to
remedy this. In a speech on the same day, General Eisenhower
expressed his hope that the Germans would one day be lined
up with the rest of the free world, and "on exactly the same
status as all other nations." He would not, he said, "be pre-
pared to command an organization in which sizable con-
tingents had been included by force, or with any disgusted
feeling." Two days later, speaking to a meeting of German
party leaders at Bad Homburg, he went a stage further. "I
have come to know," he said, "that there is a real difference be-
tween the regular German soldier and officer, and Hitler and
his criminal group. For my part I do not believe that the
German soldier as such has lost his honor." This last speech,
although considered in some quarters to be rather a studied
compliment, was greeted in Germany as "an enormous psycho-
logical step forward," and was considered to meet the long
felt want for a "rehabilitation of the German soldier." Although
the same thing had been said before by other Allied leaders,
it did now help to wipe out the impression in many German
minds that General Eisenhower had been too antipathetic to
the Germans and had regarded the German soldier as the
representative of mass murder. Yet much more than this would
be necessary before any impressive majority in the Bundestag
could be obtained in favor of the Federal Republic's making
its contribution to Western defense.
This clearly was realized by General Eisenhower, and in
his report to Congress he restated his position. While refusing
to enter into a detailed discussion of the conversations he had
held while in Germany, the Supreme Commander said:
I personally think that there has to be a political platform achieved,
an understanding that will contemplate an eventual and an earned equal-
ity on the part of that nation, before we should start to talk about in-
cluding units of Germans in any kind of army. Certainly I for one want
no unwilling contingents, no soldier serving in the pattern of the Hessians,
in any army of my command.
The implications of this report were not likely to be lost, either
in America or in Germany. In Frankfurt, the British High
Commissioner had already explained the new approach, and
expressed his agreement with General Eisenhower's belief
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that the Atlantic army should first be brought into shape and
that German participation was a secondary issue. Sir Ivone
refused to admit that there might be a "line of exasperation"
arising out of the slow fulfilment of the negotiations. He said
there must be no undue impatience, but if the Allies con-
formed steadily to the goal of equality, relations would de-
velop healthily during the next twelve months, even though
absolute equality, in view of the complex industrial, political
and economic issues that it raised, might not be achieved within
that time.
In Germany again, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,
commenting on the speech of February 1, wrote:
By his visit to the Federal Republic, General Eisenhower has learned
what many Western statesmen have not yet grasped, that the German
soldier will only be a good soldier again when the semi-colonial status
has been removed from his people. If General Eisenhower helps to spread
this knowledge, his visit to Europe has justified itself.
But perhaps the most important result was the effect of
the Supreme Commander's words in America itself. As the
London Times commented on February 5:
Even before he left on his mission he had made it plain that he
thought the handling of this problem had been unfortunate. The trouble
may have begun in the administration's heavy handed approach last
September, but since then it has become a dogma on Capitol Hill that
the Germans were longing to provide the core of the Atlantic army and
were only being stopped by French—and to a lesser extent British—
intransigence. Eisenhower made it clear that he wanted no unwilling
contingents, that at the moment the Germans were unwilling, and that it
was a mistake to manoeuvre them into a "trading position." It is probable
that no more will be heard of German participation until General
Eisenhower thinks they are ready to participate.
General Eisenhower had in fact come to the conclusion that
the risks of pressing on at the former pace in an attempt to
produce a German army at once were too great to be justified.
It was better, he felt, to go ahead with the Atlantic defense
force without the Germans, temporarily at least, even if this
should mean that this defense force would meanwhile lack
one-fifth of its eventual strength. This decision had been taken,
not for any fear of Russian reprisals, but simply because it
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484 WORLD POLITICS
had become obvious that the Germans would not willingly co-
operate without themselves enjoying a position of greater
equality within the Western world, or before the military
strength of the Atlantic community in Europe had become
really substantial. Both these conditions had been expressed by
Dr. Adenauer in the course of his five-point statement on
rearmament made at a party meeting at Bielefeld on January
14, and indeed the apparent half-heartedness of some Atlantic
treaty countries had provided many Germans with an excuse
for a new variation on the theme of "ohne mich." The Ger-
mans were no more interested than any other continental coun-
try in raising an army to serve as a defeated rearguard for a
future Dunkirk.
CONCLUSION
Indeed, it had now generally to be accepted that only time
and patience could make useful and willing soldiers of the
Germans. In the way in which the problem had hitherto been
handled there was perhaps much to regret. At the outset, by
framing plans with a gap that would be filled only by a Ger-
man contribution, the Atlantic Council had given the Ger-
mans a strong bargaining position, which would no doubt
have been exploited in Bonn even if the Germans as a whole
had been readier than they were to accept the immediate risks of
rearming. Moreover, inter-Allied disagreements on the prob-
lem had brought about unfortunate delays in the integration
of Western defense as a whole. But with the appointment of
General Eisenhower, the proper perspective seemed to have
been regained. At one stage there had seemed to be a real
danger that the Germans might be forced to rearm against
their will. This danger was now, happily, averted. It only re-
mained to hope that the new approach would prove more suc-
cessful than the old—and to reflect how far the situation, or
men's reading of it, had changed since Mr. Byrnes had said
in his speech at Stuttgart in 1946:
In agreeing at Potsdam that Germany should be disarmed and de-
militarized and in proposing that the four major powers should by
treaty jointly undertake to see that Germany is kept disarmed and de-
militarized for a generation, the United States was not unmindful of the
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responsibility resting upon it and its major Allies to maintain and enforce
peace under the law.
Freedom from militarism will give the German people the opportunity,
if they will but seize it, to apply their great energies and abilities to the
works of peace. It will give them the opportunity to show themselves
worthy of the respect and friendship of peace-loving nations, and in time,
to take an honorable place among the members of the United Nations.
It is not in the interest of the German people or in the interest of world
peace that Germany should become a pawn or a partner in a military
struggle for power between the East and the West.1
quoted in Raymond Dennett and Robert K. Turner (eds.), Documents on
American Foreign Relations, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1948, VIII, 211.
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